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Summary box
 ► Debate on global health security has focused on how 
we collectively respond to outbreaks, including what 
role and responsibility states have in supporting re-
sponse efforts to health crises beyond their borders, 
and in strengthening domestic public health capaci-
ties to detect and contain disease risks.
 ► Cuba’s history of medical internationalism and its 
domestic disease prevention and control activities 
speak directly to these debates; yet, Cuba is largely 
absent within global health security academic and 
policy discourse. Cuba’s international medical activ-
ities focused on routine health provision and crisis 
response, alongside its domestic disease control 
activities and universal health system demonstrate 
that Cuba has a strong health security capacity.
 ► Health security in Cuba also faces challenges, 
however, particularly with respect to the trade- off 
between civil liberties, regime preservation and se-
curity in protecting the state and its population from 
diseases threats, and with respect to resource con-
straints, exacerbated by the US embargo.
 ► Cuba does not frame its disease control activities 
within a discourse of health securitywhich impacts 
Cuba’s visibility and participation in the global health 
security regime. Cuba demonstrates that it is pos-
sible to make strides to improve capacity for health 
security in resource- constrained settings facing 
multiple challenges, although within a particular po-
litical context where social controls exercised by the 
state raise questions of civil liberties.
 ► The successes and challenges that characterise 
Cuba’s health security activities speak to broader 
global health security debates and are thus worth 
engaging with more explicitly in contemporary 
health security discourse and practice.
ABSTRACT
Cuba has been largely absent in academic and policy 
discourse on global health security, yet Cuba’s history of 
medical internationalism and its domestic health system 
have much to offer contemporary global health security 
debates. In this paper, we examine what we identify as 
key traits of Cuban health security, as they play out on 
both international and domestic fronts. We argue that Cuba 
demonstrates a strong health security capacity, both in 
terms of its health systems support and crisis response 
activities internationally, and its domestic disease control 
activities rooted in an integrated health system with a 
focus on universal healthcare. Health security in Cuba, 
however, also faces challenges. These concern Cuba’s 
visibility and participation in the broader global health 
security architecture, the social controls exercised by the 
state in managing disease threats in Cuban territory, and 
the resource constraints facing the island—in particular, 
the effects of the US embargo. While Cuba does not frame 
its disease control activities within the discourse of health 
security, we argue that the Cuban case demonstrates that 
it is possible to make strides to improve capacity for health 
security in resource- constrained settings. The successes 
and challenges facing health security in Cuba, moreover, 
provide points of reflection relevant to the pursuit of health 
security globally and are thus worth further consideration 
in broader health security discussions.
INTRODUCTION
Global health security, defined here as global 
policy and activity to prevent, detect and 
respond to outbreaks of infectious disease, has 
emerged as dominant policy field in global 
health. Notable outbreaks of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (2002/2003), 
H1N1 (2009), Ebola (2014–2016; 2018–) 
and Zika (2016) have highlighted the mutual 
vulnerability to infectious disease and the 
need for a collective public health response. 
This has created an (almost) global policy 
path dependency focused on prevention, 
detection and response,1 2 exemplified by the 
International Health Regulations (2005), the 
defining piece of international law to manage 
the transborder spread of infectious disease, 
and the implementation of national health 
security strategies aimed at minimising the 
threat posed by pathogens to societies and 
economies.
The 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa drew particular attention to how we 
collectively respond to outbreaks, including 
what role and responsibility states have in 
supporting response efforts to health crises 
that happen beyond their borders, and in 
strengthening domestic public health capac-
ities to detect and contain disease risks, as 
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(SDG) 3.D.3 In the wake of this epidemic, academic and 
policy debate has turned to how the system for global 
health security can be reformed.4–6 This has included 
a focus on how national and global capacities can be 
enhanced to rapidly respond to health emergencies and 
how we can connect global health security activities to 
broader health system strengthening efforts, including 
the movement towards universal health coverage (UHC), 
as championed by WHO Director- General Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus.7
Cuba’s activities in global health security speak directly 
to these debates. Indeed, Cuba has made considerable 
strides in infectious disease control, comparable to that 
of high- income countries, doing so in a low- income 
setting beleaguered by a struggling economy, and facing 
resource and access challenges from the US embargo. 
These activities are embedded within a strong integrated 
health system, of which a key constituent part is preven-
tative medicine (including vaccination for infectious 
disease) and UHC free at the point of care. Through 
its work internationally, moreover, Cuba has moved 
towards supporting SDG 3.D by assisting other countries 
in meeting their core capacities for surveillance and 
response for disease control. Importantly for the global 
health audience, Cuba demonstrates that it is possible to 
make strides to improve capacity for health security in 
resource- constrained settings facing multiple competing 
challenges, although this has been in a context of 
an authoritarian state where civil liberties have been 
questioned.8
Given these achievements, it is interesting that Cuba 
has not been referenced in broader global health secu-
rity debates; yet Cuba’s lack of visibility in health security 
academic and policy discourse is noticeable. This could 
be attributed to Cuba’s isolation geopolitically, as a small 
island state, and given that the health security policy 
field has traditionally been Western (US) dominated.9 
The Cuban government may not have wanted to engage 
in this debate, or been able to participate, based on 
political tensions, ideological differences and/or the US 
blockade of the island. Alternatively, the geographical 
focus of health security discourse (and associated prag-
matic efforts) has shifted temporally and geographically 
as the perception of ‘next big one’ has expanded from 
being focused solely on the threat of pandemic influ-
enza in South- East Asia to include haemorrhagic fevers 
in low- income and middle- income countries (LMICs) in 
Africa. Cuba might have been absent from global health 
security narratives, similar to most of Latin America, 
because it had not been prey to a major epidemic that 
has put its health system surge capacity in the spotlight. 
However, with the spread of Zika across the Caribbean 
and to Cuba, despite the government’s denial of the 
outbreak,10 this may not be an adequate explanation. 
We suggest a third consideration for the lack of Cuban 
visibility in discussions of health security: that Cuba does 
in fact demonstrate key traits which we understand to be 
health security, but it does so in the name of solidarity 
and part of a socialist project which seeks to export the 
strengths of the Cuban regime internationally. We argue 
that health security is alive and well in Cuba and offers 
insights into how we might strengthen health security 
globally, particularly in LMICs which is vital to future 
preparedness efforts, although we consider these ques-
tions cautiously, recognising the particular political 
context in Cuba and the trade- offs of civil and political 
liberties which come at the costs of such a strengthened 
health security position.
To demonstrate our argument, we focus on what we 
consider the key traits of Cuban health security, conceptu-
alised as falling into two main categories: Cuban medical 
engagements internationally, and Cuban health provi-
sion domestically. We then consider some of the chal-
lenges for health security in Cuba, notably the tension 
between providing complete security from the threat of 
disease and protecting civil rights within the state, and 
the impact of the US embargo on Cuban health security, 
before reflecting on what we can learn from the Cuban 
experience in improving health security globally.
This paper uses a case study methodology to under-
stand how Cuba exhibits tendencies in global health 
security. The empirical material for this paper was 
drawn from a series of semistructured elite interviews 
conducted in Havana in December 2018 with policy-
makers, medical professionals and other infectious 
disease control experts working in Cuba. These data 
were subsequently transcribed, and thematic analysis was 
conducted to identify key trends that appeared in the 
qualitative material. We further undertook documentary 
analysis of policy documents from a range of sources, 
including the Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP), 
CubaCoopera (a government department responsible 
for medical internationalism) and the WHO/Pan Amer-
ican Health Organization (WHO/PAHO), along with 
media sources both from Cuba (Granma) and interna-
tionally. These documents were sourced both in English 
and in Spanish, and where necessary, translations are the 
authors’ own.
This material was triangulated against secondary 
literature including academic literature on health 
policy, international relations and Cuban/Latin Amer-
ican studies. These sources were identified through 
Medline, Google Scholar and snowballing from these 
and international and Cuban contacts. This latter step 
was important for two reasons: First, having undertaken 
interviews with policymakers from a one- party state that 
has worked hard to control information, we wanted to 
ensure that we were not solely reproducing the narrative 
that the Cuban government wished us to voice, but that 
this was contextualised amid other research and find-
ings within health and/or security analysis of the island. 
Second, as Hollander states, short- term research visits to 
socialist countries can be wholly misrepresentative,11 so 
we wanted to ensure that our findings were reflective of 
broader debates and narratives within the literature on 
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CUBA’S MEDICAL INTERNATIONALISM
Cuba’s programme of medical internationalism has been 
well documented by Latin- American scholars and anthro-
pologists.12–15 Medical internationalism involves sending 
medical brigades on missions abroad to offer routine 
health services, respond to crises as well as bringing 
medical students and patients back to Cuba for educa-
tion and/or treatment. We consider this to be the most 
apparent embodiment of Cuban health security activities 
internationally, where the state appears to be supporting 
response efforts for emerging pathogens by providing 
human resources and technical expertise within outbreak 
response, and health systems capacity- building elsewhere 
in the world, such as the training of international medical 
professionals.
Particularly significant from the standpoint of global 
health security is the role that these Cuban doctors, partic-
ularly the Henry Reeve Brigade, have played in supporting 
responses to a number of epidemic outbreaks. Brigades 
were deployed to El Salvador, Ecuador, Nicaragua and 
Honduras between 1999 and 2003 to support dengue 
fever response efforts.12 Moreover, the Cuban govern-
ment was one of the first to respond to the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa and its Henry Reeve Brigade 
constituted the largest international bilateral support 
to arrive in the region.16 This stands in contrast to the 
criticism that the global community as a whole has faced 
for its delayed and inadequate response to the crisis.4 
The Cuban delegation, under WHO, was particularly 
involved in direct care to patients in Ebola Centre Modi 
(Liberia), Kerry Town and Port Loko (Sierra Leone) 
and supported the establishment of the Coyah Ebola 
Treatment Centre (Guinea). To do so, Cuban brigadistas 
received comprehensive training at the Tropical Medi-
cine Institute, Instituto Pedro Kouri (Havana), demon-
strating the significant health security competency and 
capacity within Cuba. This training included the use of 
personal protective equipment, biosecurity standards for 
patients and staff, treatment and diagnostic techniques, 
and risk scenario activity planning, and can now be used 
to launch a response to other diseases (Interview, Insti-
tuto de medicina tropical Pedro Kouri).
More routinely, Cuba deploys up to 20% of all its 
medical professionals to a number of non- crisis settings.17 
This has involved medical teams totalling over 325 000 
health personnel, in over 150 countries, including within 
the WHO and the G8 states.18 19 These Cuban medical 
teams have tended to work in rural communities or in 
urban slums, areas that often have not had state medical 
provision prior to Cuban arrival due either to an inability 
to recruit medical practitioners to live and work in 
these areas, or a lack of monetary motivation to estab-
lish provision where the local community has not been 
able to afford associated care costs, such as out- of- pocket 
payments. As routine access to health professionals facil-
itates the detection of diseases sooner, such activity can 
be considered to directly contribute to increased global 
health security, although notably this has not necessarily 
been the aim of any such brigade’s mission. Indeed, 
despite these efforts to support the development of 
health systems and respond to health crises, Cuba does 
not frame these activities within the discourse of health 
security. Rather, Cuba’s medical internationalism is 
framed as the embodiment of international solidarity 
and considered an extension of Cuba’s national health 
policy within the socialist framework. Interviewees cited 
‘serving a global population’ rather than protecting 
Cuba’s citizens against pathogen spread as reason for 
crisis interventions.9
Recent media coverage of the closure of the Mais 
Medicos programme20 in Brazil has focused on the polit-
ical determinants of these overseas medical missions, 
where Cuban doctors are sent to provide healthcare in 
exchange for oil or hard currency.12 21 Political moti-
vations have also been suggested as standing behind 
Cuba’s provision of over half of the medical professionals 
for Mission Barrio Adentro in Venezuela, Chavez’s (now 
failing) health and social welfare programmes focused on 
delivering universal healthcare across poorer neighbour-
hoods.22 Such activities have spurred discussion on the 
motivation for this Cuban international activity, whether 
driven by international prestige,14 goodwill, soft power,12 
solidarity13 or economic gain.23 Cuba’s medical missions 
have also been criticised for violating the (labour) 
rights of those deployed. There is some suggestion, for 
example, that these doctors may not have autonomous 
decision- making regarding whether they want to deploy 
on these international missions, but rather are forced to 
do so by the government.24 Recent legal proceedings in 
Brazil, moreover, have sought to show that the Cuban 
model of exporting physicians for economic gain violates 
the International Labour Organization’s agreement on 
the protection of wages.24 This is based on the findings 
from the Mais Medicos programme that suggest that 
Cuban medics received significantly less in wages than 
their international counterparts, with the majority of the 
wages paid directly by Brazil to Cuba for its doctors being 
retained by the Cuban state.23 24
Discussions about the profit- making nature of these 
overseas medical missions suggest that Cuba’s medical 
internationalism may be less about a notion of interna-
tional solidarity or global health security, but rather func-
tions as a form of income generation for the government 
within a failing economic system. In this respect, the 
contribution of these missions to global health security 
might be overegged and simply a by- product of govern-
ment financing. Nevertheless, we suggest that this activity 
could be considered part of a Cuban contribution to 
global health security and may offer lessons for strength-
ening national and global rapid response capacities for 
disease emergence, as the deployments and training of 
the Henry Reeve Brigade suggests. Indeed, the global 
response to the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic was criticised 
as being ‘hampered by a lack of trained and experienced 
personnel willing to deploy to the affected countries’.25 
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of medics deployed, Cuba’s medical brigades and the 
training they receive offer insights into how such a rapid 
response capacity might be achieved. Moreover, the focus 
of Cuba’s medical internationalism in strengthening 
the provision of routine health services in resource- 
constrained settings speaks to a broader vision of health 
security than disease containment and response alone—a 
focus of current debates concerning how global health 
security activities can be integrated in a more sustained 
way into broader health system strengthening and UHC 
aims. Yet, this deployment of Cuban teams has also 
raised concerns of taking jobs away from locally qualified 
physicians and healthcare workers, which raises further 
questions of sustainability within health systems24 as a 
cornerstone of UHC.
CUBA’S INTEGRATED HEALTH SYSTEM
Discussions on Cuban healthcare tend to focus on its 
government- run, integrated health system,26 rooted in a 
fundamental right to health as part of the socialist project; 
to provide a range of preventative and curative services 
free of charge to all. These services have produced world- 
leading health outcomes and demonstrate what is possible 
to accomplish in a resource- poor setting, allowing Cuba 
to demonstrate a strong domestic health security position, 
although the veracity of some of these claims has been 
disputed.27 In particular, critiques have highlighted that 
the Cuban image of a high- performing system appears to 
be almost exclusively based on infant mortality rates—an 
explicit point of focus of Cuban government policy—at 
the cost of other health indicators, including maternal 
mortality, disability, disease exposure and life expec-
tancy, and underinvestment in the social determinants 
of health more broadly.27 28 Moreover, even this infant 
mortality rate has been questioned29 with regards to its 
accuracy, relative to the counterfactual30 and potential 
case- definitional differences to routine practice making 
Cuba dramatically outperform its regional (and global) 
neighbours.
Focusing on infectious disease in particular, there are 
three key components to Cuba’s domestic health secu-
rity: disease surveillance and control, Cuba’s biotech-
nology industry and universal healthcare. First, Cuba 
has focused considerable efforts on reducing or elimi-
nating disease threats from its territory. This has included 
decades of work reducing HIV/AIDS infection, including 
eradicating mother- to- child transmission of HIV, through 
prevention and destigmatisation campaigns,31 although 
this has come at a cost of human rights through the 
compulsory testing and indeed quarantining of those 
infected (Interview, Biosecurity expert).32 33 Similarly, 
Cuba eliminated malaria on the island in 1973, and main-
tains this status, although through mandatory prophy-
laxis of those returning (or indeed arriving) in Cuba 
from endemic regions. The country has also managed 
to eliminate 13 diseases since 1960, including measles, 
rubella, mumps, tetanus, meningitis B and C, and hepa-
titis B. (Interview, Ministerio de Salud Publica).
When the threat of Zika spread across the Americas, 
Cuba was quick to take proactive moves to stop the intro-
duction of the disease within its borders. This included 
mass fumigation campaigns, the deployment of the mili-
tary to clean civic spaces where mosquitoes may grow, and 
an appeal to citizens enforced by law, to support control 
efforts and ensure that private dwellings remained 
clear from mosquitoes and therefore, disease.34 35 Such 
procedures are rooted in disease- specific action groups 
for health concerns; for example a dengue task force, 
empowered at multiple levels of governance from the 
municipality to the MINSAP and deployed in the case 
of a dengue outbreak with the exclusive task of bringing 
about the outbreak’s end (Interview, Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO)). This provides Cuba with 
surge capacity to systematically respond to and manage 
health security concerns that occur within its borders. 
These groups work alongside the routine health service, 
and with civil defence units to respond to crisis events 
and mobilise quickly to minimise any potential threat to 
the population (Interview, Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO)).
More systematically, Cuba has a distinct focus on 
rigorous point- of- entry controls. Indeed, the main role of 
MINSAP’s health surveillance unit is to prevent the intro-
duction of infections to Cuba (Interview, Ministerio de 
Salud Publica). When Cuban nationals return to Cuba 
from states that have endemic infectious diseases, they 
are subject to rigorous airport screening. This informa-
tion is passed to their neighbourhood doctor for daily 
or weekly follow- up to ensure that individuals are not 
experiencing unusual symptoms and if they are, to facil-
itate rapid treatment, including if necessary, mandatory 
treatment and/or quarantine to avoid further disease 
transmission (Interview, Instituto de Medicina Tropical 
Pedro Kouri). The ability of the health system to facilitate 
such personalised follow- up, to ensure rapid treatment 
and to limit further infection is remarkable, and from a 
public health perspective, it far outperforms any health 
system in the global North, if not from a human rights 
perspective. These point- of- entry protocols are enforced 
for every flight and include airport scanners and in- air-
port medical professionals. If necessary, those arriving 
in Cuba may be taken directly to a doctor and/or the 
tropical medicine institute, IPK (Interview, Instituto de 
Medicina Tropical Pedro Kouri). This quarantine and 
prophylaxis procedure at Instituto de Medicina Tropical 
Pedro Kouri (IPK) includes all medics returning to Cuba 
from Ebola- infected or malaria- infected locations, who 
are subject to a mandatory 21 days stay at IPK.
Second, Cuba has a booming biotechnology industry, 
with significant investment made by the Cuban state into 
research and drug development to ensure access to medi-
cines should an outbreak emerge. As Cuba is unable to 
purchase many global biomedical products, owing to 
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strides taken to ensure indigenous production of these 
medicines, treatments and future research represents 
demonstrable activity in maintaining Cuba’s health secu-
rity to ensure a healthy and productive population. For 
example, this has included development of a vaccine for 
dengue fever, meningitis B, hepatitis B and many more 
besides.36 37 Moreover, a biosecurity level 3 laboratory 
(Interview, Ministerio de Salud Publica) and the devel-
opment of other biomolecular diagnostic laboratories 
that can do diagnosis incountry mean that Cuba does not 
have to send virus samples elsewhere (Interview, Minis-
terio de Salud Publica).
Third, Cuba maintains almost UHC. UHC has been 
championed as a key mechanism to developing health 
systems resilient to disease outbreaks.38 39 Cuba demon-
strates how the mechanisms and processes for providing 
UHC to the population also provide the foundation for 
effective infectious disease control. Cubans can seek 
medical advice through free and easily accessible consul-
tations with health professionals through the consultorio 
(neighbourhood health clinic), established ‘on every 
block’ with a doctor and nurse in each community—
with approximately one consultorio per 1000 people. This 
has only been possible through significant government 
investment in healthcare as a priority since the Revolu-
tion (although the motives for this are in part because 
the majority of doctors in Cuba fled at that time (Inter-
view, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)).
For more specialist care, patients are referred to 
a policlinico (polyclinic), particularly specialising in 
maternal and child health, chronic disease support and 
minor surgeries. The initial aim of this family centred 
programme was to decentralise hospital activities, to free 
up space in the system to manage the most serious of 
cases and to allow for surge capacity in the event of an 
emergency. Yet the medics, and importantly nurses, who 
work in these consultorios and policlinicos who offer general 
medical provision also play a decisive role in epidemi-
ology and disease prevention. In terms of epidemiolog-
ical surveillance, the ‘doctor on the corner’ functions to 
record any epidemiological changes in the community. 
For example, dengue outbreaks, which occur with some 
frequency across Cuba, are rapidly detected and within 
a matter of days integrated vector control activities will 
have begun due to the epidemiological reporting of the 
local consultorio. The close contact between the nuclear 
family and the doctor on every corner facilitates this 
rapid detection and response, ensuring that infections 
do not become major outbreaks and that infection 
control protocols are implemented (Interview, Minis-
terio de Salud Publica). This is in spite of no automated 
infrastructure and a paper- based surveillance system in a 
resource- poor setting.
This infectious disease surveillance also pre- empts 
disease outbreaks through annual health checks on all 
members of the community (dispensarizacion). Through 
this process, the consultorio preclassifies potential ‘at risk’ 
citizens based on social factors which may make them 
predisposed to infectious disease should it arise (Inter-
view, Ministerio de Salud Publica; Interview, Pan Amer-
ican Health Organization (PAHO)). This preventative 
approach to disease control also relies on preventative 
care through increased vaccination coverage and health 
awareness among the population, reducing the chances 
of an outbreak taking hold in the country, the latter 
evidenced by the successful management of the HIV/
AIDS crisis on the island.31 Thus, Cuba demonstrates 
how the mechanisms and processes for providing UHC 
to the population also provide the foundation for effec-
tive infectious disease control, although this has been in a 
political context where the components of disease surveil-
lance, biotechnology and universal healthcare form part 
of a broader narrative of regime preservation. Indeed, if 
the goal of the Cuban state is to preserve its borders and 
political narrative, then ensuring that its population has 
protection from infectious disease and access to routine 
healthcare functions also to reassure citizens in an effort 
to avoid internal sedition and lack of faith in the socialist 
project. Nevertheless, while learnings from Cuba must 
be considered within an instrumentalist paradigm and 
recognise that Cuba’s health security activities may not be 
as portable to different political and social environments, 
Cuba’s integration of community- based healthcare and 
disease surveillance and control activities does provide 
a pertinent example for broader global health security/
UHC debates as to what this might look like in practice, 
and how effective UHC can be for ensuring global health 
security.
CUBAN HEALTH SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
Despite Cuba’s strong health security position, Cuban 
health security activity is not framed as such, and this 
framing may well have an impact on Cuban visibility 
within this global policy space. In turn, there are further 
impediments to Cuban participation and recognition as a 
leader within the global health security architecture. For 
example, Cuba claims to have met all the core capacity 
requirements for disease surveillance and control under 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005), but 
has yet to agree to undergo a joint external evaluation 
(JEE) to externally verify these capacities. Although 
interviewees stated that plans were afoot for a JEE in 
2019, we were unable to find evidence of this at the time 
of writing. This lack of clarification over the status of the 
JEE is also mirrored in Cuba’s failure to report outbreak 
events to WHO, as required under the IHR (2005), 
including during the Zika outbreak and rumoured 
cholera outbreaks across the island. Where reports have 
been made, the case numbers reported have sometimes 
been manipulated so as not to reveal the full extent of the 
outbreak (Interview, Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO)). Thus, while Cuba may demonstrate achieve-
ments in global health security, it also appears to be a 
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Cuban health security activity, moreover, is not without 
its own challenges. As highlighted above, the ability for 
the state to mandate prophylaxis or quarantine for those 
potentially infected by a particular virus, not to mention 
pre- emptive activity on citizens deemed to represent risks 
to collective health security on the island, raises ques-
tions of civil liberties and human rights within the Cuban 
health sector. Much has been written about Cuba’s 
abuse of human rights and tight authoritarian control 
in other sectors,41 42 so this may not be of surprise from 
a broader Cuban structural perspective. Yet, within the 
health sector, there is no right to privacy in the physician- 
patient relationship, no right to informed consent and 
no right to refuse treatment.43 These challenges point to 
an inherent tension within health security between the 
protection of civil liberties and public health, as encapsu-
lated by the Siracusa Principles.44 The social control exer-
cised by the Cuban state thus raises questions of where 
the line between liberty and security lies and what rights 
governments have to restrict individual freedom in the 
name of public health—a debate that has also played out 
in other contexts, such as in the handling of patients with 
multidrug- resistant tuberculosis globally.45
A further challenge to Cuba’s health security is the 
level of underdevelopment that remains across much 
of the island. Vast swathes of the island live in poverty, 
without routine access to water or sanitation services, 
with open sewers or water that is unable to drain because 
of poor civic planning (Interview, Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO)). This can have a direct influence 
on susceptibility to vectorborne or waterborne disease. 
Failure to maintain sewage systems in a civic infrastruc-
ture struggling to financially support itself has led to an 
increase in diarrhoeal disease and cholera.16 This lack of 
investment in the socioeconomic determinants of health, 
potentially as a consequence of the decisive focus on 
infant mortality within the health sector, poses a contra-
diction to so much of the success that Cuba can show in 
terms of an exemplary health security capacity in such a 
resource- poor setting. It also demonstrates the inequali-
ties across the system; while the consultorio model and thus 
‘health security’ may work in urban areas, this may not be 
replicated across the system in poorer zones (Interview, 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)).46 Thus, 
socioeconomic development and indeed, resources 
remain a key limitation of health security in Cuba. Lack 
of government funds means that in the event of a major 
outbreak there may be limitations on equipment, deploy-
ment activities elsewhere, and research and development 
achievements.
These resource constraints are exacerbated by the US 
embargo, which has been almost continuously in place 
since 1960. This has wide- ranging effects across areas of 
domestic policy, and despite having little impact on life 
expectancy,30 we propose that the embargo does have a 
potential impact on the health security strengths of the 
system.47 For example, the embargo on US goods means 
that pharmaceutical ingredients or products produced 
in USA or with a patent held by a US company are not 
available in Cuba. This means that Cuban access to newer 
international drugs is limited and may directly impact 
on the health security of the nation if a newly emerging 
pathogen appears and a drug is developed that Cubans 
are not able to access (Interview, Ministerio de Salud 
Publica). This also extends to medical equipment. There 
have been efforts by Cuban medics to circumvent this 
medical embargo, through sourcing medication from 
third party states, but this has been met with indignation 
and legal challenge by the USA.
CONCLUSION
While it is impossible to imagine a replication of the 
Cuban health system in other resource- poor settings 
owing to the uniqueness of the political situation, this is 
not to say that meaningful lessons cannot be ported. In 
particular, Cuba demonstrates how a health system that 
is prevention- oriented and community- based contrib-
utes to reducing infectious disease threats—a key point 
of focus in contemporary global health security debates. 
Here Cuba provides a much needed example of how 
disease surveillance and control efforts can be inte-
grated with community- based primary healthcare to 
provide for health security in low- income settings. Cuba’s 
medical internationalism, moreover, demonstrates the 
effectiveness of frequently offering national doctors for 
international disease control efforts, allowing for a well- 
trained and readily deployable medical corps to respond 
to disease both within Cuba and abroad. The training 
provided to the Henry Reeve Brigade in responding to 
the 2014 Ebola outbreak is particularly illustrative of how 
national and global surge capacity to respond rapidly to 
health crises might be achieved. The focus on strength-
ening routine healthcare as well as health crisis response 
in Cuba’s medical internationalism, moreover, opens up 
space to reflect on how global health security activities 
might be integrated into longer- term health interven-
tions.
Despite these activities, however, Cuba remains largely 
at the margins of global health security policy and 
debate, with implications for Cuba’s engagement with 
the global health security regime, as encapsulated by 
the IHR (2005), and for Cuba’s visibility in global health 
security policy and practice. Indeed, the US embargo, 
Cuba’s development and resource challenges, and the 
tight social controls exercised by the state in managing 
disease threats in its territory also speak to broader global 
health security issues. These concern global access to 
essential medicines and commodities, the development 
of sectors beyond health alone in reducing vulnerability 
to disease, and the trade- off between civil liberties and 
public health in disease control efforts. The Cuban case 
thus offers opportunity for more in- depth reflection as 
to the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary health 
security practices, although with the caveat that lesson 
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the tensions within the Cuban political system in relation 
to civil and political freedoms, the critiques concerning 
Cuba’s instrumentalist promotion of its health system 
and the trade- offs which had been decisively made for 
the prioritisation of disease control and infant mortality.
Correction notice This article has been corrected since it published online to 
reflect the correct author names in reference 40.
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